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Introduction
Since its launch in June 2007, the EU-Cen-
tral Asia Strategy has been reviewed twice 
in Joint Progress Reports published by the 
Council and the European Commission. 
The latest review (June 2010) concludes 
that more work is needed on the ‘definition 
of [the EU’s] interests and priorities, the 
visibility of EU activities, and the coordina-
tion within the EU as well as with other ac-
tors’.1 One year later, prior to the launch of 
the EU-Central Asia Rule of Law Platform 
project, this conclusion deserves special 
attention as regards the European Rule of 
Law Initiative (RLI), one of the most promi-
nent and crucial elements of the Strategy’s 
regional dimension.2 
EU support for legal reform initiatives in 
Central Asian states did not begin with the 
2007 Strategy and its RLI. Since their in-
dependence, the Central Asian states have 
benefited from various technical assistance 
programmes from the Commission and EU 
Member States. The 2007 Strategy pre-
sents itself as the political superstructure to 
the Commission’s development strategy.3 
Security, stability and economic relations 
are highlighted as the EU’s key interests 
in Central Asia. Rule of law is seen as an 
essential condition, but its development is 
challenged by a number of risk factors.
In Central Asia political instability is clearly 
linked to unequal wealth distribution and 
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corruption, which leads to increased social 
tensions, migration and high crime rates. 
Instability is also caused by the ethnic, 
political and economic fragmentation of 
the Central Asian region and the unequal 
distribution of resources such as gas, 
oil and water. At the same time, economic 
interdependency, a Soviet heritage, 
remains high among Central Asian states. 
Afghanistan also poses a threat due to 
the spill-over of extremist Islamic activities 
and organised crime specialising in 
trans-border trafficking of human beings, 
weapons and drugs. Indeed, tensions 
arising as a result of these threats should 
be addressed at a regional level. However, 
such an approach is often hampered by the 
largely monopolised political structures and 
resulting restricted access to resources 
and economic power.4 
It is hardly surprising that the RLI is presented as a key 
element of the 2007 Strategy. Central Asian governments are 
less interested in democratisation programmes, but they are 
interested in reforming the rule of law, where Europe is seen as a 
natural partner. The EU wants to meet this Central Asian demand 
as it believes that long-term stability can only be achieved on the 
basis of good governance, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and democratic values and a market economy.5 Central 
Asian governments and the EU can work together on this as 
both see functioning legal systems, including a strengthened 
commitment to international law, as crucial to socio-economic 
development as well as for the region’s trade and investment 
links with the outside world. They are also essential for better 
regional cooperation, which the RLI tries to anticipate through 
regional activities addressing common challenges on the basis 
of a common legal heritage. 
Therefore, an innovative aspect of the RLI’s approach is not only 
the attempt to set up ‘a coordination mechanism among EU insti-
tutions and Member States to further support the modernisation 
of the legal sector, as part of a more comprehensive strategy.’6 It 
also aims at ‘a concerted regional approach, taking into account 
national situations’.7 In terms of content and approach the RLI 
therefore deserves pride of place within EU-Central Asia Strat-
egy reviews.
This policy brief, first evaluates the relevance of the 2010 review 
for the RLI by assessing the definition of interests and priorities, 
coordination and visibility within the RLI’s framework. Secondly, 
it introduces the Rule of Law Platform project (RLP) as an instru-
ment to meet the RLI’s current shortcomings. Following the as-
sessment of the RLP’s potential and risks, the paper concludes 
with recommendations on how to assure the efficiency of the 
RLP in strengthening the RLI.
The Rule of Law Initiative: 
Priorities, coordination and visibility
The concept paper on the RLI states that the first joint meeting 
of justice ministers from EU Member States and Central Asian 
countries, which launched the Initiative in Brussels in November 
2008, should identify the priority themes for a Rule of Law 
Platform. Here, the Ministers expressed the desire to continue 
cooperation ‘in all fields of law [...] in the framework of the concept 
paper on the RLI’8, which would include criminal, administrative, 
substantive private, procedural private and police law. However, 
at the same time the 2008 Ministerial Conference decided that 
constitutional and administrative law were priorities, as well 
as training, for all legal and judicial professions. The Ministers 
also noted their ‘interest’ in further cooperation in the sphere 
of criminal law, especially on issues of criminal procedure. The 
second Ministerial Conference took place in Dushanbe in June 
2010. Besides legal training, the final communiqué now explicitly 
referred to criminal law as a priority area. Furthermore, it 
reaffirmed the desire to continue cooperation ‘in all fields of law’ 
and recommended for further discussion‚ new targeted actions 
in additional areas of cooperation of legal reforms and judiciary 
systems such as access to law [...] commercial jurisdiction and 
law, and transposition of international norms and their effective 
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7 European Commission External Relations, Concept Note, EU-Central Asia Rule of 
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9 Joint Communiqué, Launch of the EU’s Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia, 
Brussels 27-28 November 2008.
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areas for assistance to Central Asia: 1. ‘Promotion of regional cooperation and good 
neighbourly relations’; 2. ‘Poverty reduction and increasing living standards’; 3. 
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European Commission External Relations, Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 
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11 French and German public operators (ACOJURIS - Agence de Cooperation 
Juridique International, GIZ, and IRZ - Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche 
Zusammenarbeit) and Justice Ministries are also working in close cooperation. They 
are working with other European Member States and operators as well.
application in the national context’.9 
The communiqués of both Ministerial Conferences show a 
tendency to prioritise legal training and criminal law but lack an 
overarching orientation. Instead, they point to a variety of law 
fields as potential priority areas. Some relate to specific priorities 
identified in bilateral negotiations with each Central Asian country 
in the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument’s (DCI) Indicative 
Programme (2011-2013).10 Others relate to ongoing programmes of 
specialised agencies, e.g., commercial jurisdiction and law from the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), or 
constitutional and administrational law from the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe. This makes RLI priorities appear ad-hoc. 
Instead of outlining a well-defined long-term common European 
strategy RLI priorities respond to the diverse capacities, interests 
and strategies of individual organisations or development 
instruments and to the demands of Central Asian governments. 
At present it seems that the RLI is little more than an umbrella 
term for previously existing initiatives relating to the rule of law in 
Central Asia funded under different headings and priorities.
Regarding coordination, the RLI framework has led to improved 
collaboration among a core group of European actors. But, 
this group appears exclusive and its activities opaque for other 
actors. The latest planning meeting to follow up on the Ministerial 
Conference of June 2010 took place in February 2011 in 
Brussels. The list of participants, which was seen by the author, 
gives a realistic picture of who is (not) involved in coordinating 
actions within the RLI: the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), Finland, France, Germany, and the Venice Commission 
participated in the meeting.11 At present, they are the EU’s key 
actors interested and engaged in coordinating the RLI.
When the RLI was launched, Germany and France, in close 
cooperation with the Commission, agreed to lead the coordination 
of EU activities as focal countries. Following the first Ministerial 
Conference in 2008, France supported the organisation of a first 
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regional seminar on ‘Penal procedures and respect for rights of the 
defence’ in Tashkent, which was followed by a regional seminar 
organised with the support of Germany on ‘Legal Training in the 21st 
Century’ in Bishkek. Subsequent to the 2010 Ministerial Conference, 
both countries are planning a second set of regional seminars, most 
likely continuing the same subject areas, prior to the next Ministerial 
Conference in 2012.12 In addition, Finland is planning to support a 
regional seminar on ‘Access to Justice’. Finland, who only recently 
joined the coordination group, will significantly increase the volume 
of development cooperation in the region by 2013.13 
One of the EU’s cooperation partners within the RLI framework is 
the Venice Commission, which is implementing two RLI projects.14 
Although Central Asian countries want technical assistance from 
the Venice Commission, it is unclear if the work will continue to be 
funded after 2011, as co-financing has to be found. Furthermore, 
the EEAS and the Council of Europe are trying to widen their 
cooperation considerably by including other areas of the EU-Central 
Asia Strategy.15 Though working on the Initiative’s priority fields, the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR, 
Warsaw) is excluded de facto from RLI coordination meetings. This is 
unfortunate as all Central Asian states are OSCE members and host 
OSCE field missions with established contacts in local governments.16 
EU Member States like the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, which 
have been active in this sector in Central Asia are not part of the group. 
Specialised civil society organisations and donors with outreach to civil 
society and government structures in Central Asia are also absent.
The Initiative’s shortcomings in coordination are linked to its lack 
of visibility and transparency. The one number to call – a clear 
entry point to the EU’s RLI – is still missing. Documents required 
to understand the concept of the RLI are not available on EU 
websites, even though public documents like the EU-Central 
Asia Strategy reviews refer to them. Access to basic documents 
such as the RLI concept note is restricted to a small group of 
insiders. By June 2011, the in principle public communiqué of the 
2010 Ministerial Conference in Dushanbe is still not available on 
the web. The conference itself, attended by only one of the five 
Central Asian ministers of justice is not even mentioned on the EU 
Delegation to Tajikistan website. More detailed conference reports 
and discussions of the Initiative’s future prospects are not public. 
Public statements like the following suggest that too much 
transparency is unwelcome: ‘Progress, experience and priorities 
at regional – and country – level will be assessed through dialogue 
with the authorities concerned, as well as with EU member states 
and other relevant donors’.17 Instead of allowing the Initiative to gain 
momentum by making it more visible, transparent and accessible to a 
broader public, it remains largely closed, bound by the EU respecting 
the sensitivities of the Central Asian states’ authoritarian leaders. The 
EU’s political leverage, however, is limited in this region. Russia and 
China are better placed to exercise their regional influence quickly and 
effectively, based on the similarities of their political regimes which are 
less constrained, for example, by internal mechanisms of democratic 
control. In this geopolitical context, the EU relies on the socialising 
effects of rather discreet negotiations and cooperative diplomacy.18 
EU ‘socialisation’, however, has previously proven successful thanks 
to broader people to people contacts and legal and normative 
approximations where commitments are made public and visible.
Thus, progress of the RLI since its launch in 2008 is still limited. 
12 Other than in 2009, no financial support for these regional seminars will be 
provided by the Commission in 2011. France, therefore, prefers to postpone the 
organisation of the next regional seminar to have it financed in the framework of 
the Rule of Law Platform project in 2012. Germany, on the other hand, plans the 
seminar for autumn 2011, depending on the available capacities of the organising 
Ministries and public operators.
13 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Guidelines for Finland’s Policy on Eastern 
Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Helsinki 2010, p. 21.
14 The first, comprehensive project, runs for 2 years until December 2011 and covers 
all five Central Asian states. It includes objectives such as further development 
of constitutional mechanisms aimed at strengthening the principles of rule of 
law, enhancing the efficiency and independence of the judiciary, reform of the 
institution of public prosecution, further integration of international law into national 
legal systems, the reform of electoral systems and training of public administration 
officials, judges and lawyers. The second project aims specifically at assisting 
the authorities in reforming the legislation of Kyrgyzstan in line with international 
standards following the constitutional referendum of 27 June 2010.
15 On 11 May 2011, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe took the 
remarkable decision to extend possible cooperation with non-member countries in 
Europe’s neighbourhood, including all five Central Asian states. This cooperation 
could cover fields as wide as assistance to prepare the access of Central Asian 
states to open Council of Europe conventions, the fight against corruption, money 
laundering, drug abuse, election observation, etc., and would be funded by the EU.
16 An example for the need to improve coordination between the EU and OSCE/
ODIHR in the rule of law field is the fact that the 2010 Ministerial Conference on 
the RLI was immediately followed by the OSCE/ODIHR Criminal Justice Forum 
for Central Asia, which was organised by OSCE/ODIHR two days later in the 
same hotel in Dushanbe. Even though both events brought together hundreds of 
high level policymakers, academics and professionals to chart directions for legal 
reform in Central Asia, they were not linked with each other.
17 DCI, p. 12, op. cit.
18 Cf. Schmitz, p. 334.
19 Concept RLP, op. cit.
20 Specific long-term projects include programmes provided by Member States or 
the Commission as well as twinning and other programmes between European 
and Central Asian institutions. Cf. Concept RLP, op. cit.
21 Cf. Concept RLP, op. cit. and EuropeAid/130949/C/SER/RSC.
The June 2010 review’s assessment that a precise definition of 
interests and priorities, improved coordination and higher visibility 
are needed, remains as valid as it did then. The launch of the RLP 
support project is expected to bring significant improvements by 
outsourcing the implementation of further Rule of Law Platform 
activities as a ‘project’ to a ‘high quality contractor’.19 
The Rule of Law Platform
As recently as April 2011, the Commission announced a tender 
for the RLP support project with a May 2011 deadline. Aside from 
specific long-term projects,20 the RLP itself is the second of the two 
kinds of actions which constitute the RLI. The RLP is expected to 
respond to the need for stepping-up dialogue and cooperation on 
rule of law issues. It is to take over the organisation of actions or 
events envisaged in the implementation of the RLI. Activities include: 
forums for dialogue, such as ministerial conferences, workshops and 
seminars; training and development of expert programmes, including 
the establishment of a regional network of trainers and training 
institutions and expert missions to Central Asia; communication and 
networking including the mapping of rule of law programmes and 
facilitating the sharing of experience among rule of law experts, such 
as, through the establishment of a website in all local languages; an 
advice facility to carry out studies at regional and/or national level, 
policy advice, analysis/assessment support, and/or background 
documents necessary to complement the meetings and/or training 
financed from this project. For all this, a total of 2 million euros is 
allocated under the DCI for 3 years, starting in October 2011.21 
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The RLP has the potential to address current shortcomings in 
the previously mentioned setting of priorities, coordination and 
visibility. Above all, coordination of the RLI is expected to improve 
considerably with the launch of the RLP support project. According 
to the RLP concept note, a Steering Committee will ensure regular 
meetings between the EEAS and Commission, coordinators of the 
Initiative, interested EU Member States, and the five Central Asian 
countries. Furthermore, it will develop three year and annual 
work plans,22 which can be instrumental in specifying the guiding 
priorities of the RLI, with the support of the advice facility. New 
communication tools can address shortfalls in the RLI’s visibility.
At the same time, this ambitious platform project carries serious 
constraints and risks. Considering the tight budget of approximately 
130,000 euros per country per year, the total amount and the 
impact of RLP activities might not meet expectations. The ensuing 
disappointment could risk jeopardising the positive effects of RLI’s 
increased visibility. Moreover, financial dependency could lead to 
further fragmentation and the RLP being hijacked by co-financing 
actors, with their own national or institutional agendas, particularly 
since the RLI does not have a consolidated common strategy for 
the region. Finally, a contractor for three years without substantial 
presence in Central Asia and unfamiliar with the RLI network, 
including its regional actors, could cause further disintegration and 
downgrade ownership on the Central Asian side.23 
Recommendations
Given the tension between the range of expected RLP activities 
and its limited resources, the RLP’s steering actors should focus 
on actions which can strengthen the chances of the RLI becoming 
a dynamic and integrating key element of a common EU-Central 
Asia strategy. To this end:
1. The Rule of Law Platform should further profile the RLI as the 
political superstructure for EU engagement in this field with 
Central Asian states, including for activities that take place on 
a bilateral basis. The RLI could then offer political guidance. 
To achieve this, the link and consistency between priorities 
defined at the RLP forums for political dialogue on the one hand 
and the bilateral funding under EU’s Indicative Programmes 
on the other should become more visible and evident. 
2. Focus on a single rule of law strategy would enhance 
ownership of the RLI by all actors, including Central Asian 
republics, as well as increase its overall impact by improved 
linking and integration of fragmented actions. Likewise, the 
RLP should consider creating success stories around a 
limited set of priorities which clearly mark the impact and 
public benefit of EU actions for the wider Central Asian public. 
3. The RLI coordinators, including the RLP contractor, 
should provide an easy entry point for interested actors 
who want to coordinate their activities within the RLI. At 
the same time, participation of all relevant actors in RLI 
coordination should be promoted more actively, without 
giving up on the idea of focal countries leading the overall 
coordination. Links to similar initiatives and their key actors 
in the European neighbourhood should be explored. 
22 Cf. Concept RLP, op. cit.
23 On 30 March 2011, a shortlist of potential contractors was published on the EuropeAid 
website under the reference: EuropeAid/130949/C/SER/Multi.
24 Cf. DCI, p. 10, op. cit.
4. RLP work programmes should be published on a RLI website, 
together with all other relevant documents. More visibility 
and transparency will not only address the present lack of 
accountability and scrutiny, but will also ensure broader 
involvement of civil society in Europe and Central Asia. 
5. The RLP should strive to further deepen the involvement of 
parliamentarians and civil society actors specialised in EU-
Central Asia relations and in issues related to the rule of law, 
where appropriate. In particular, this would strengthen their 
ability to monitor reform, evaluate the impact of EU rule of law 
programmes and hold the EU and Central Asian governments 
to account. To achieve more ownership on their side, rule of 
law experts from parliaments and civil society could be invited 
to observe RLP Steering Committee activities. Furthermore, 
they could be consulted on RLP work programmes. A 
mechanism to support independent civil society activities 
could draw on experiences with the Civil Society Facility, 
as it is planned for the European Neighbourhood and as it 
operates in EU pre-accession countries.
Conclusion
The RLP has the potential to be more than an ill-resourced 
additional fragment of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. In 
the Commission’s own words, it will become a strong and efficient 
coordination mechanism to ensure proper links between policy 
dialogue and project implementation, as well as ownership by the 
various stakeholders.24 
In a region where the living conditions can force societies to 
challenge their political regimes in search of a better political 
order, the EU should stand for a credible alternative by furthering 
values such as the rule of law through the RLI and by offering 
a convincing example of how improved regional cooperation can 
work. In the long run, the RLI should be up-graded to become 
a centre of gravity, a guiding principle for any strategy designed 
by the EEAS and the Commission, EU Member States or other 
donors to assist rule of law development in Central Asian states. 
The RLP project will need more substantial means in order to 
develop its full potential as a platform for political dialogue and as a 
central stimulus for accelerated reforms through better knowledge 
transfer in Central Asia. Only this way will it dispel the image of 
weakness created by half-hearted symbolic actions. Maybe then, 
what makes the RLI a key element of the EU’s Strategy for Central 
Asia will become more evident: A coherent strategy, flanked by 
visible and effective coordination of the EU’s already substantial 
bilateral engagement in Central Asia in the rule of law field. 
Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation of the 
EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge hub on 
broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Specifically, the project aims to:
• Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying specific attention 
to security, development and the promotion of democratic values within the 
context of Central Asia’s position in world politics;
• Enhance knowledge of Europe’s engagement with Central Asia through top-
quality research and by raising awareness among European policy-makers 
and civil society representatives, as well as discuss European policies 
among Central Asian communities;
• Expand the network of experts and institutions from European countries and 
Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on European-Central 
Asian relations.
Currently, the broader programme is coordinated by FRIDE, in partnership 
with the Karelian Institute and CEPS, with the support of the Open Society 
Institute and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main outputs of the 
project are a series of policy briefs and comprehensive reports on key issues 
facing the Europe-Central Asia relationship. 
Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu. If you have any comments 
or suggestions, please email us at email.eucam@gmail.com 
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